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Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 
The Constitutional Attack on 
Canada’s Ban on Assisted  
Dying: Missing an Obvious Chance  
to Rule on the Charter’s  
Disability Equality Guarantee 
David Lepofsky* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Is it important only to legal scholars that the Supreme Court decided 
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General),1 — the landmark, assisted dying 
case — under the wrong Charter provision? In this case, when the Court 
struck down the Criminal Code provision that makes it a crime to assist 
another person to end their life (section 241(b)),2 it found an unjustified 
violation of Charter section 7.3 This provision guarantees that no one will 
be “deprived” of their “life, liberty or security of the person”, except “in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”4 The Court did 
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1  [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 (S.C.C.), revg [2013] B.C.J. No. 
2227 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Carter”]. 
2  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 241(b) [hereinafter “Criminal Code”]. 
 Section 241(b) provided that, [e]very one who……(b) aids or abets a person to commit 
suicide, whether suicide ensues or not, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding fourteen years. 
3  Carter, supra, note 1, at para. 147. 
4  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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not consider whether the impugned law violated the principle of disability 
equality guaranteed by Charter section 15. This section guarantees the 
constitutional right to equality “before and under the law”, and to “the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination” on various 
grounds, including “mental or physical disability”.5 
To Charter claimants, it is the result of a case, and not a court’s typically 
impenetrable legal reasoning, that usually matters. Yet this article’s question 
is important to legal scholars, Charter rights-holders and obligated 
organizations alike. If the Supreme Court fails to see a glaring Charter 
disability equality violation, this can be symptomatic of a bigger problem. 
Consider an historic example involving discrimination based on race 
and religion — not disability. Five years after World War II, in Noble v. 
Alley,6 the Supreme Court considered whether to enforce a restrictive 
covenant on property that forbade owners from, inter alia, selling the 
property to “any person of the Jewish, Hebrew, Semitic, Negro or 
coloured race or blood.”7 Unlike both lower courts, the Supreme Court 
commendably declined to enforce the covenant. However it did so by 
reasoning that the restrictive covenant was void for uncertainty.8 
After Canadians heroically gave their lives in the fight against Nazi 
racism and anti-Semitism, it would have been a cruel irony for a 
Canadian court to deploy state power to enforce racist and religious 
bigotry. Viewed through the lens of hindsight, the Supreme Court 
reached the right result. No doubt, its majority latched on to the most 
readily available legal doctrine to do so. Would it be too much to expect 
of the Supreme Court of that day, to refine Canadian common law to 
explicitly enshrine the principle of racial and religious equality? The U.S. 
Supreme Court would show that kind of historic judicial leadership just 
                                                                                                                       
 Charter s. 7 provides, “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and 
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” 
5  Id., Charter s. 15. This section provides: 
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental 
or physical disability. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object  
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those 
that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age 
or mental or physical disability. 
6  Noble v. Alley, [1950] S.C.J. No. 34, [1951] S.C.R. 64 (S.C.C.), revg [1949] O.J. No. 466 
(Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Noble”]. 
7  Id., at 3. 
8  Id., at 5 (per Rand J.A., Kellock J.A., Estey J.A. & Fauteux J.A.). 
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four years later when it overturned institutional racism in schools and 
other public services in Brown v. Board of Education.9  
In Carter, unlike Noble, the Supreme Court had legal tools readily at 
hand, that would have enabled it to reach the same result that it did, but 
by viewing the case through the lens of equality. This article shows that 
disability equality should have been the judicial focus of this case, and 
that Charter section 7 should not be used in these situations. It concludes 
with proposals for refinements of constitutional doctrines that flow from 
this analysis.  
II. CARTER: IT’S ALL ABOUT DISABILITY EQUALITY 
What does it look like when the Supreme Court stares right at a case that 
“screams” disability equality, but treats it as something different, using  
a different Charter provision, enacted for different purposes, with an 
analytical framework that can disregard disability equality’s aims and tools?  
Carter is, first and foremost, a disability equality case. The Carter 
claimants were people with serious disabilities. That was what brought 
them to court. The claimants wanted to be able to end their lives at the 
time of their individual choosing.10 Their claim was to a right of access to 
disability accommodation. (At trial, Smith J. also provided compelling 
reasons why the legislation violated Charter section 15’s disability equality 
guarantee.11)  
Anyone who has no disabilities can end their own life when and how 
they wish, without needing another’s help. Whatever be one’s moral, 
religious or political views about ending one’s life, it is legal to think about 
it, talk about it, try it, and even do it. There was a time when attempting 
suicide was a crime in Canada. That absurd offence was removed from the 
Criminal Code in 1972.12  
The Carter claimants contended that they would not be able to end 
their own lives, because of their disabilities. They needed help to carry 
out that wish. If they had found someone willing to assist, such as a 
                                                                                                                       
9  Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (U.S.S.C.) [hereinafter 
“Brown”]. 
10  Carter, supra, note 1, at para. 11. 
11  Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] B.C.J. No. 1196, 2012 B.C.S.C. 886, at 
paras. 1009-1077 (B.C.S.C.), revd [2013] B.C.J. No. 2227 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Carter – trial 
decision”]. 
12  The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1968-1969, S.C. 1968-69, c. 38. Discussed in Carter – 
trial decision, id., at para. 105. 
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doctor, the only barrier that stood in their way is section 241(b) of the 
Criminal Code.13 This section made it a crime for anyone to 
accommodate the applicants’ disabilities by assisting them to do 
something that everyone else can do. A law that operates to criminalize 
the willing provision of a disability accommodation is a transparently 
obvious, glaring section 15 disability equality violation. 
Is it exceptional for a law to make it illegal to provide a disability 
accommodation? Examples are in subsections 44.1 and 44.2 of Ontario’s 
Election Act.14 These provisions ban the use of network-connected voting 
technology in Ontario provincial elections, forbidding telephone and 
Internet voting. These technologies could, for the first time, fully enable 
many voters with disabilities to independently and privately mark their 
ballot and verify their choices in a provincial election. For example, a blind 
or dyslexic voter cannot mark a paper ballot and verify their choice on their 
own, in private, on voting day in their local polling station. The ability to do 
so is central to Charter section 3’s right to vote. People with disabilities 
have fought for this voting accommodation in Canada for years.15  
These election provisions impose an arduous legislative regime to get 
that ban lifted. They, inter alia, give Ontario’s unelected and unaccountable 
Chief Electoral Officer an absolute and arbitrary veto.16 Ontario legislation 
unjustifiably bans this access technology in provincial elections, even 
though Ontario municipal legislation ironically does not ban telephone and 
Internet voting. At least 44 municipalities have deployed some form of 
telephone and/or internet voting for municipal elections.17 
The Supreme Court’s failure to approach Carter as a disability equality 
case is not due to a current deficiency in section 15 disability equality 
jurisprudence — though the Court’s exploration of Charter disability 
equality did get off to a bad start. Two decades earlier, the Court’s initial 
effort at expounding on disability equality was a profound disappointment. 
One of its earliest ventures at applying section 15’s disability equality 
                                                                                                                       
13  Criminal Code, supra, note 2. 
14  Election Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.6, ss. 44.1 and 44.2. 
15  See e.g., AODA (Accessibility for Ontarians With Disability Act) Alliance, “2014 Updates” 
Online: <http://www.aodaalliance.org/strong-effective-aoda/ElectionInOntario.asp>. 
16  Id. 
17  See AODA (Accessibility for Ontarians With Disabilities Act) Alliance, “Elections 
Ontario Report on Telephone and Internet Voting is a Slap in the Face to Voters With Disabilities – 
Elections Ontario Refuses to Now Use Its Authority to Test Telephone and/or Internet Voting in By-
Elections, Despite Their Use in 59 Municipalities and Nova Scotia and No Findings that they were 
Hacked or Unreliable” (26 June 2013), online: <http://www.aodaalliance.org/strong-effective-
aoda/06272013.asp>. [hereinafter “AODA Alliance Website”]. 
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guarantee was in Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education.18 Here, the 
Court unanimously and wrongly rejected a claim that segregating public 
school students with disabilities outside the mainstream classroom, in 
segregated special education classes, was a per se denial of section 15’s 
guarantee of a right to equality for children with disabilities, that cannot 
stand absent a Charter section 1 justification.19  
In Eaton, the Supreme Court failed to apply the Ontario Court of 
Appeal’s commendable treatment of disability segregation in school as 
presumptively unconstitutional, requiring a section 1 justification.20 The 
Court also did not follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s pivotal and 
transformative racial discrimination approach from Brown that in 
schools, “separate but equal” was a denial of equality.21  
Elsewhere, I have catalogued Eaton’s serious analytical deficiencies.22 
Beyond my earlier critique, the Supreme Court’s oral argument transcript 
reveals two troubling perspectives on disability equality. The first 
instance occurred when Emily Eaton’s lawyer argued that unwanted 
segregation of a student with a disability like Emily’s is presumptively an 
equality denial, just as segregation on the basis of race was found to be a 
racial discrimination in Brown.23 Then, Gonthier J.A. made a startling 
suggestion that disability is different from race, since one is born with 
one’s race, but not one’s disability.24 
Mr. Justice Gonthier: I think I agree with you that whether forced 
segregation is, per se, discrimination and [a] violation of equality rights, 
so we can assume that one first has to establish that. And you have made 
some reference to the Brown case that dealt with racial segregation and  
I am just wondering whether we are on all fours with that, because race, 
of course, is something you are born with and, very often, there is very 
little relevance to the treatment that is given to your race. But when you 
are dealing with a disability, is that not fundamentally an individual 
condition and you get a whole range of disabilities? 
                                                                                                                       
18  Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1996] S.C.J. No. 98, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 24 
(S.C.C.), revg [1995] O.J. No. 315 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Eaton”]. 
19  Id., at para. 80. 
20  Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1995] O.J. No. 315, 22 O.R. (3d) 1, at 13 
(Ont. C.A.). 
21  Brown, supra, note 9, at 483. 
22  David Lepofsky, “A Report Card on the Charter’s Guarantee of Equality to Persons with 
Disabilities After 10 Years. What Progress? What Prospects?” (1997) 73 NJCL, at 263. 
23  Brown, supra, note 9, at 495. 
24  Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, “Oral Arguments Transcript, File 24668”  
(8 October 1996), at 86 [hereinafter “Eaton, Oral Arguments”]. 
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Mr. Stephen Goudge, QC [as he then was]: Absolutely. And I say, with 
the greatest respect, My Lord, that often disability is something you 
were born with as well. And I simply say, My Lord, that what is at 
stake, if I am right, is that the segregation, the forced segregation of 
people because of disability is prima facie a violation of their equality 
rights. I am not saying at all that there should not then be a careful 
analysis of the individual needs of that disabled person. That is the 
Section 1 analysis.25 
In the second instance, counsel for the intervener Ontario Public School 
Boards Association, speaking for all of Ontario’s public schools, was 
defending the public school’s segregation of Eaton. In her oral argument 
she explicitly distinguished between students with disabilities on the one 
hand and “normal” students on the other. This transparently offensive and 
grossly outdated term drew no response from the bench. She argued: 
Our system is set up on the basis of pupil needs, even those of non-
exceptional pupils. The materials you have before you indicate  
that every pupil, whether exceptional or non-exceptional, must be 
approached as an individual. The Ministry of Education mandates  
that is what school boards do. They approach each child and its 
determination is made with respect to the needs of each child. One 
child may need a little bit more work in reading and writing. In the case 
of an exceptional child, the needs are much, much different, much 
greater than the needs of a normal child in a regular class.26 
Imagine if in the employment context, one referred to “normal 
employees” on the one hand, and female employees or non-white 
employees on the other. For counsel representing all Ontario’s public 
schools during oral argument, in Canada’s highest court on a major 
disability equality case, to refer to people with disabilities as not being 
“normal” is emblematic of wrenching discriminatory attitudes that have 
held people with disabilities back for so many decades.  
Happily, the Eaton case’s rough start on disability equality was 
substantially superseded by two later Supreme Court cases. The most 
recent of the two cases, Moore v. British Columbia (Education)27 though 
decided under human rights legislation and not under the Charter, takes a 
far more modern, egalitarian approach to disability equality in the 
                                                                                                                       
25  Id. 
26  Eaton, Oral Arguments, supra, note 24, at 61 (emphasis added). 
27  [2012] S.C.J. No. 61, 2012 SCC 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360 (S.C.C.), varg [2010] B.C.J.  
No. 2097 (B.C.C.A.). 
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education context. Although it does not openly claim to overturn Eaton, 
it effectively relegated Eaton to the back drawer of constitutional history.  
There is also Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General),28 
Canada’s most powerful judicial pronouncement on constitutional 
disability equality and accessibility. This case provides a good, strong 
and clear enunciation of disability equality. It holds that a core feature of 
the constitutional right to disability equality is the duty to accommodate 
disability-related needs.29 It follows that, equality for people with 
disabilities is denied where there is “a failure to ensure that they benefit 
equally from a service offered to everyone.”30 As the Court explains, it 
would be “a thin and impoverished vision of s. 15(1)”31 to approach 
equality as if “governments should be entitled to provide benefits to the 
general population without ensuring that disadvantaged members of 
society have the resources to take full advantage of those benefits.”32  
By criminalizing the voluntary provision of a requested and needed 
accommodation to a person with a disability, the Criminal Code’s 
assisted dying ban flew in the face of Eldridge. It also failed the Eldridge 
requirement that a law be designed to take into account the needs of 
people with disabilities.  
Sadly, Carter is not the only case where the Supreme Court missed a 
glaring constitutional disability equality violation. In R. v. Swain,33 the 
Supreme Court tackled the constitutionality of the Criminal Code’s 
treatment of accused persons with mental health conditions. Historically, 
the Criminal Code subjected a subset of accused persons with mental 
health disabilities to inherently more onerous procedures. If an accused 
was judged unfit to stand trial, he or she could be detained indefinitely 
before trial, for periods that could be longer than the maximum prison 
term to which he or she were exposed if convicted.34 As well, if an 
accused person with a mental health disability was found not guilty by 
reason of insanity, he or she could also be detained indefinitely, 
potentially for periods longer than would apply if he or she were found 
                                                                                                                       
28  [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.), revg [1995] B.C.J. No. 1168 
(B.C.C.A.). 
29  Id., at para. 79. 
30  Id., at para. 66. 
31  Id., at para. 73. 
32  Id., at para. 72. 
33  [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.), revg [1986] O.J.  
No. 2358 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Swain”]. 
34  Id., at para. 31. 
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guilty of the same offence.35 Furthermore, the prosecution could force the 
insanity defence on an accused who did not want it raised at his or her 
trial.36 This exposed the accused to a far greater liberty intrusion via 
potentially much longer incarceration. Those found not guilty by reason 
of insanity or unfit to stand trial were mandatorily detained indefinitely.37 
They were afforded slim procedural protections for a post-trial review of 
their detention.38 These did not include the level of procedural 
protections available for convicted offenders who apply for parole. The 
provisions created a blistering disability equality violation. If they were 
to survive, they would have cried out for a section 1 justification for 
disability discrimination.  
In a bizarre twist, the Swain majority (written by Lamer C.J.C. [as he 
then was]) turned attention in one isolated context to section 15 disability 
equality. Its analysis was seriously flawed. It held that the common law 
rule, permitting the prosecution to force an insanity defence on an 
unwilling accused, violated Charter section 7.39 The Swain majority 
enunciated a new common law rule, and then subjected it to section 15 
scrutiny.40 It held that its new common law rule did not violate the 
section 15 equality rights of accuseds with a mental disorder, on whom 
an insanity defence is forced by the prosecution, over their objection41 — 
a hopelessly erroneous conclusion.  
The Swain majority then concluded that it was open to a party to raise 
that section 15 question afresh in a future case,42 — as if a lower court 
might promptly reject the Supreme Court’s pronouncement on the 
constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s brand-new common law rule. 
In Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General),43 the earlier 
Supreme Court case that upheld the Criminal Code’s assisted dying ban, 
the majority assumed without commenting on it, that the provision 
violated section 15 disability equality.44 The majority upheld that 
provision under Charter section 1.45 At least the majority gave some tacit 
                                                                                                                       
35  Id., at para. 31. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  Id., at paras. 5, 8, 17 and 31. 
39  Id., at para. 47. 
40  Id., at paras. 75-88. 
41  Id., at para. 88. 
42  Id. 
43  [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.), affg [1993] B.C.J. No. 461 
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”]. 
44  Id., at paras. 184-185. 
45  Id., at paras. 186-189. 
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attention to section 15. Yet by failing to explore the meaning of disability 
equality and how it was violated, and by simply assuming a violation  
and then proceeding to section 1, the Rodriguez majority failed to ensure 
that its section 1 analysis gave disability equality the weight and 
understanding it deserved.  
In her Rodriguez dissent, L’Heureux-Dubé J.A. went even further off 
track. She found that the impugned provision violated Charter section 7 
but not section 15. She held: 
…this is not at base a case about discrimination under s. 15 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and…to treat it as such may 
deflect the equality jurisprudence from the true focus of s. 15.46 
Exacerbating this statement, L’Heureux-Dubé J.A. embarked on a 
section 7 fundamental justice, arbitrariness analysis that was nothing 
short of a finding that the law treated Sue Rodriguez worse because of 
her disability: 
In summary, the law draws a distinction between suicide and assisted 
suicide. The latter is criminal, the former is not. The effect of the 
distinction is to prevent people like Sue Rodriguez from exercising the 
autonomy over their bodies available to other people.47 
Such judicial failures to see glaring section 15 disability equality denials 
run the long-term risk of disability equality being counterproductively 
downplayed and sidelined. This is especially troubling since disability 
equality is the only constitutional right that our political leaders decided to 
add to the proposed Charter during Canada’s 1980-82 patriation debates.48 
Missing a disability equality violation can directly affect the court’s 
overall assessment of a case. When the Government must justify a Charter 
violation under section 1 as a reasonable limit on Charter rights, the 
Government’s burden is higher, where the Charter rights violation is more 
severe.49 If a law violates two of a claimant’s Charter rights at the same 
time, this should at least in some situations constitute a more severe Charter 
rights intrusion than if only one of their Charter rights has been violated.  
                                                                                                                       
46  Id., at para. 196. 
47  Id., at para. 212. 
48  David Lepofsky & Jerome E. Bickenbach, “Equality Rights and the Physically 
Handicapped” in A.F. Bayefsky & M. Eberts, eds., Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) 323, at 332. 
49  Reference re Criminal Code (Canada), ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) (Man.), [1990] S.C.J.  
No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at para. 5 (Dickson C.J.C concurring) (S.C.C.), affg [1987] M.J.  
No. 453 (Man. C.A.). 
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A context-sensitive section 1 analysis should take into account the 
nature and goals of the Charter right or rights that were infringed. If the 
impugned law is a glaring denial of disability equality, any section 1 
analysis that is oblivious to this fact is not context-sensitive. 
If disability equality is not included in the section 1 mix, on the 
grounds that only a section 7 violation has been found, the section 1 
analysis can be distorted. This unfairly skews the section 1 analysis 
against the claimant and the Government gets an undeserved windfall. As 
well, as part of its section 1 analysis under the Oakes test,50 how can a 
court accurately conclude that an impugned law minimally impairs 
Charter rights if the court does not examine all the Charter rights that the 
impugned law violates? 
When crafting a remedy that is appropriate and just in the 
circumstances within the meaning of Charter section 24(1), a court must 
be alive to all the Charter rights that the defective legislation violates. 
Otherwise, a court cannot be certain that its remedies will serve to fully 
respect all Charter rights that are in jeopardy. In Carter, if the section 15 
violation is as I describe, the remedy of assisted dying should extend to 
persons with disabilities who are free from external coercion, and who 
cannot end their own life without assistance, due to their disability. That 
is different from the Carter decision’s remedy.51  
These problems arise whether section 15 equality rights are 
overlooked because lawyers argued section 15 but the court chose not to 
rely on it, or because lawyers never raised section 15 and the court did 
not press counsel about it. The Charter’s disability equality guarantee is 
over a third of a century old. It is fair to expect judges to raise it, even if 
parties did not. 
Does this all become academic since in Carter, the Charter claimants 
won? No. In Carter, the Court gave guidance on what Parliament must 
consider when reforming the law.52 If section 15 disability equality is not 
considered, this judicial guidance risks being incomplete. The post-
Carter decision, broad public discussion and debate about designing new 
legislation to address assisted dying would benefit from judicial 
recognition that disability equality is on the table. As shown above, 
section 15 would have influenced Carter’s remedy. 
                                                                                                                       
50  R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at paras. 69-71 (S.C.C.), affg 
[1983] O.J. No. 2501 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
51  Carter, supra, note 1, at para. 127. 
52  Id., at paras. 126-132. Swain, supra, note 33. 
(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) CARTER V. CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL) 99 
III. IT WAS WRONG TO DECIDE CARTER UNDER  
CHARTER SECTION 7’S PROBLEMATIC  
“OVERBREADTH” PRINCIPLE 
Making things worse, in Carter, the Supreme Court ventured further 
down its inherently flawed road of deploying Charter section 7 when an 
impugned law is found to be “overbroad”.53 In my view, the three related 
bases that the Supreme Court crafted for section 7 fundamental justice 
review — arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality — are 
each fatally problematic bases for invalidating a law under section 7. 
Under these overlapping principles, an impugned law that deprives a 
person of their right to life, liberty or security of the person violates the 
principles of fundamental justice, contrary to section 7, if: 
(a)  the impugned law’s means is not rationally connected to its purposes 
(arbitrariness);54 
(b)  the law goes too far, interfering with conduct having no connection 
to the impugned law’s objective (“overbreadth”),55 or 
(c)  the impugned law’s effect is grossly disproportionate to its objects. 
(“gross disproportionality”).56  
In his excellent “Circularity, Tautology and Gamesmanship: ‘Purpose’ 
Based Proportionality-Correspondence Analysis in Sections 15 and 7 of 
the Charter”,57 constitutional scholar and litigator Hart Schwartz shows 
that the section 7 fundamental justice “overbreadth” principle is 
irremediably unprincipled and hollow. As Schwartz argues, it inevitably 
produces an unavoidable unprincipled “arcane game” in court.58  
In a section 7 overbreadth case, a court’s declaration of an impugned 
law’s purpose inevitably dictates the case’s outcome. A judge has 
sweeping discretion over how to frame a law’s purpose. It can be defined 
in a way to yield the result that a legislature’s means for achieving that 
purpose is a perfect fit. Alternatively the court can define the law’s 
                                                                                                                       
53  Carter, supra, note 1, at paras. 85-88. 
54  Id., at paras. 83-84. Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, [2013] 
SCC 72, at para. 111 (S.C.C.), varg [2012] O.J. No. 1296 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Bedford”]. 
55  Carter, supra, note 1, at paras. 85-88. Bedford, supra, note 54, at paras. 112-113. 
56  Carter, supra, note 1, at paras. 89-90. Bedford, supra, note 54, at paras. 103-106. 
57  Hart Schwartz, “Circularity, Tautology and Gamesmanship: ‘Purpose’ Based Proportionality-
Correspondence Analysis in Sections 15 and 7 of the Charter” (2016) 32 NJCL, at 1 [hereinafter 
“Schwartz”]. 
58  Id., at 3. 
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purpose in a way that results in the chosen legislative means being an 
unconstitutionally overbroad mismatch.  
Litigators know that a decisive tactical aim in case preparation is framing 
the impugned law’s purpose. The Charter claimant frames the law’s purpose 
to make its means mismatch its ends; the law’s defender frames the law’s 
purpose to show that it is a perfect fit with the law’s means. There is no 
principled constitutionally “right” definition of a law’s objective, so as to 
direct a judge to what they should do, when judging the parties’ verbal tennis 
match over the law’s purpose. There is no principled basis constraining a 
judge’s decision on how to frame an impugned law’s purpose during a 
section 7 overbreadth analysis. There is no principled constraint on appellate 
review of a lower court’s identification of an impugned law’s purpose. 
Thus, a section 7 overbreadth case’s key issue, on which the outcome 
depends, is entirely discretionary at trial. It is reviewable de novo with 
unbridled discretion at each appeal level.  
How can a legislature know in advance if it has fulfilled its Charter 
duty? How is a potential litigant to know if a Charter challenge is worth 
pursuing, with all its costs and hardships? The legislator and rights 
claimant face this question, equipped only with a pair of dice in hand. 
The Supreme Court faced this problem in R. v. Moriarity.59 The Court 
did not identify the problem’s severity, as delineated by Schwartz — 
whose article had not yet been published. The Court sought to provide 
guidance to trial judges on how to identify an impugned law’s purpose 
for section 7’s overbreadth analysis. Yet its guidance provides no clarity, 
simply because none is possible.  
In Moriarity, the Court held that a court’s description of a law’s 
purpose “should focus on the ends of the legislation rather than its 
means.”60 The law’s purpose should be described at “an appropriate level 
of generality” and should “capture the main thrust of the law in precise 
and succinct terms. …”61 The Court warned against framing a law’s 
purpose “in too general terms”, and against an “unduly broad statement 
of purpose “on the one hand”, or doing so “in too specific terms” on the 
other.62 The Court added little when it directed: 
The appropriate level of generality, therefore, resides between the 
statement of an “animating social value” — which is too general — and  
                                                                                                                       
59  [2015] S.C.J. No. 55, 2015 SCC 55 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Moriarity”]. 
60 Id., at para. 26. 
61 Id. 
62 Id., at para. 28. 
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a narrow articulation, which can include a virtual repetition of the 
challenged provision, divorced from its context — which risks being  
too specific.63 
It similarly achieved little by directing that a law’s purpose “should 
generally be both precise and succinct”.64  
Its attempt at clarification culminated with an admonition, which 
merely wishes away the problem, rather than providing lower courts with 
informative criteria:  
…Courts should be cautious to articulate the legislative objective in a 
way that is firmly anchored in the legislative text, considered in its full 
context, and to avoid statements of purpose that effectively 
predetermine the outcome of the overbreadth analysis without actually 
engaging in it.65 
Any principle of fundamental justice must provide “objective and 
manageable standards” for the application of section 7.66 Schwartz’s 
analysis shows that the section 7 overbreadth doctrine does not and cannot 
fulfil this indispensable requirement.67  
It is no answer to this criticism to point to the fact that there is a 
purpose/means analysis in the section 1 Oakes test for rational connection 
and proportionality.68 This is so because under section 1, the state does  
not have utter freedom to frame a law’s purpose as it wishes. Unlike the 
section 7 proportionality analysis, the section 1 analysis requires the state to 
show that the impugned measure’s purpose is a pressing and substantial one, 
sufficiently important to outweigh the Charter rights that the measure 
infringes.69 If a government, defending a law, frames too weak a purpose  
for the impugned law, it could fail that threshold, section 1, pressing 
objective requirement. This analytical constraint is not replicated in the 
Supreme Court’s section 7 arbitrariness/overbreadth/gross disproportionality 
principles. Moreover, the section 1 purpose/means analysis is only reached 
after a court has found that an impugned measure violates a constitutional 
                                                                                                                       
63  Id. The Court, in this quote, references Carter, supra, note 1, at para. 76. 
64  Id., at para. 29. 
65  Id., at para. 32. 
66  Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 486, at para. 499 (per Lamer J.A.) (S.C.C.), affg [1983] B.C.J. No. 2259 (B.C.C.A.) 
[hereinafter “BC Motor Vehicle Act Reference”]. 
67  Schwartz, supra, note 57, at 3. 
68  Oakes, supra, note 50. 
69  Id. 
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right listed between Charter sections 2 and 23. It is not part of the 
adjudication of whether one of those rights has been infringed. 
To supplement Schwartz’s excellent critique, I add that the Supreme 
Court’s section 7 overbreadth principle suffers from additional, irremediable 
fatal flaws. First, it inevitably makes an impugned law’s policy wisdom 
the test for its constitutionality. With other Charter rights, and with other 
section 7 doctrines, a court must measure an impugned law against a 
fundamental and recognizable constitutional norm, such as freedom of 
expression or religion, freedom of movement into or out of Canada or 
among its provinces, or freedom from unreasonable search or seizure. 
Whether an impugned law comports with or violates one of those 
fundamental constitutional norms is not determined by a naked judicial 
assessment of the impugned law’s policy wisdom.  
However, in the case of the section 7 overbreadth principle, and in  
the case of its arbitrariness and gross disproportionality doctrines, a 
constitutional decision boils down to just that. This is the case, even if 
judges do not think that is what they are doing, or believe that doing so is 
inappropriate, and even if judges explicitly say that a law’s policy 
wisdom should not be the test of its constitutionality.  
In section 7’s earliest days before the courts, the Supreme Court wisely 
enunciated a bedrock principle in the BC Motor Vehicle Act Reference:  
…the principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic 
tenets of our legal system. They do not lie in the realm of general 
public policy but in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of 
the justice system.70 
The Supreme Court thus held that courts should avoid “adjudication 
of policy matters”.71  
That the Supreme Court has devolved into making a law’s policy wisdom 
the implicit test of its constitutionality, despite that wise judicial warning, is 
typified by a case as early as the BC Motor Vehicle Reference itself, and  
by as recent a case as Bedford (where the Supreme Court reaffirmed its  
troubled section 7 proportionality analysis).72 In the BC Motor Vehicle Act 
Reference’s very first sentence, the Supreme Court proclaimed: 
A law that has the potential to convict a person who has not really done 
anything wrong offends the principles of fundamental justice and, if 
                                                                                                                       
70  BC Motor Vehicle Act Reference, supra, note 66, at para. 30 (emphasis added). 
71  Id., at para. 30. 
72  Bedford, supra, note 54, at para. 97. 
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imprisonment is available as a penalty, such a law then violates a 
person's right to liberty under s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms…73 
In Bedford, the Supreme Court spoke in terms of “inherently bad 
laws” violating section 7: 
The s. 7 analysis is concerned with capturing inherently bad laws: that 
is, laws that take away life, liberty, or security of the person in a way 
that runs afoul of our basic values.74  
For the court to assign itself to decide if a law is “inherently bad” or 
punishes conduct that is not really “wrong” is an overt invitation to make 
the law’s policy wisdom the test of its constitutionality. Sadly, a judicial 
admonition that the principles of fundamental justice do not lie in the 
realm of public policy cannot countermand this. The two contradictory 
propositions cannot co-exist in peace and harmony. 
The section 7 overbreadth principle entitles a court to review de novo 
the policy wisdom of any penal offence with a possible imprisonment 
penalty. The right to liberty is violated whenever a law creates an offence 
that can lead to a punishment of imprisonment. This is so, even if 
imprisonment is not a mandatory penalty. 
Bedford made this problem worse where it held that a law is 
overbroad under section 7 if it applies to fact situation in one case where 
it should not apply.75 A court need only find that the facts before it do not 
fit the impugned law’s purpose, and overbreadth is proven, in the case of 
legislation that deprives a person of their life, liberty or personal security. 
The only way to get around this is to rely on the fact that this clear 
pronouncement in Bedford was obiter. It was unnecessary to that 
decision. Bedford found the impugned prostitution provisions applied in 
many situations where they are unjustified.76 Supreme Court obiter 
dicta is not binding.77  
This Bedford obiter departs substantially from settled jurisprudence 
which Bedford did not say it was overturning. As noted, the Charter does 
not require legislation to fit perfectly. It is impossible to craft legislation 
                                                                                                                       
73  BC Motor Vehicle Act Reference, supra, note 66, at para. 1 (emphasis added). 
74  Bedford, supra, note 54, at para. 97 (emphasis added). 
75  Id., at paras. 122 and 127. 
76  Id., at paras. 139-145. 
77  R. v. Henry, [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, 2005 SCC 76, at para. 57 (S.C.C.), affg [2003] B.C.J. 
No. 2068 (B.C.C.A.). 
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with perfection.78 As well, it contradicts the Supreme Court’s contextual 
approach to Charter rights for a single fact situation to invalidate an 
otherwise valid law, regardless of the severity of the deprivation of life, 
liberty or personal security.  
The overbreadth jurisprudence, crystallized in Bedford, invites an 
accused, in any case where imprisonment is a possible penalty, to present 
evidence and arguments to the trial judge to show that he or she did not 
do anything that is really wrong, in the circumstances. Charter section 7 
lets a judge decide to acquit, if the judge thinks that the accused did not 
do anything that is really wrong, and if the law really should not apply in 
that accused’s circumstances. This erroneously converts each trial court 
into a mini-parliament, making gut decisions on whether an accused’s 
conduct should be a crime, or whether their conduct was “morally wrong” 
or “morally innocent”.79  
Second, further supplementing the Schwartz critique, the section 7 
arbitrariness/overbreadth/gross disproportionality principles each violate 
another settled doctrine for the interpretation of the principles of 
fundamental justice. In Cunningham v. Canada,80 the Supreme Court held: 
The principles of fundamental justice are concerned not only with the 
interest of the person who claims his liberty has been limited, but with 
the protection of society. Fundamental justice requires that a fair 
balance be struck between these interests, both substantively and 
procedurally…81 
Yet according to Bedford, the arbitrariness/overbreadth/gross 
disproportionality principles, no longer involve a court in weighing the 
public interest against any private interests that a Charter claimant invokes, 
when deciding whether a law violates the principles of fundamental 
justice.82 Proponents of the Supreme Court’s arbitrariness/overbreadth/gross 
disproportionality principles may argue that Bedford’s doctrinal change is of 
no moment, since under this fundamental justice analysis, a court does not 
                                                                                                                       
78  Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 
1 S.C.R. 497, at paras. 105-106 (S.C.C.), affg [1996] F.C.J. No. 511 (F.C.A.). 
79  BC Motor Vehicle Act Reference, supra, note 66, at paras. 14-15 and 30 (per Lamer J.). 
80  [1993] S.C.J. No. 47, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cunningham”]. 
81  Id., at para. 17. 
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assess whether an impugned law’s purpose is important enough to warrant 
an intrusion into the rights to life, liberty or personal security. As such, they 
may argue that this regime gives government a major break. However, a 
constitutional lens that tells judges that under section 7 fundamental justice, 
the only perspective that counts is that of the Charter claimant is one-sided, 
and hence, lopsided. If a court is going to test a law’s policy wisdom, which 
the overbreadth principle necessarily invites, it must consider both 
perspectives under section 7.  
This section 7 jurisprudence has led Canada to the very place against 
which some litigants forewarned over 30 years ago, when the Supreme 
Court first considered how to approach section 7. In the BC Motor Vehicle 
Act Reference, Attorneys General warned the Supreme Court not to open 
section 7 to assess a law’s substantive content and not just its procedure for 
decision-making in individual cases.83 They cautioned that to empower 
courts under section 7 fundamental justice, to review a law’s substantive 
design, and not just its procedural fairness, would threaten to lead Canada 
down the harmful path that the U.S. Supreme Court erroneously blazed 
from 1905 to 1937 under the now-discredited “substantive due process” 
jurisprudence originating with Lochner v. New York.84  
During the Lochner “substantive due process” era, U.S. courts struck 
down progressive social legislation under the U.S. Constitution’s due 
process clauses, not due to procedural unfairness, but due to a judicial 
conclusion that those laws violated substantive norms of freedom of 
contract. After three controversial decades of this, the U.S. Supreme 
Court dramatically retreated from this substantive due process regime. 
That retreat started in 1937 with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.85 The 
substantive due process years are now viewed as a flawed period in U.S. 
constitutional history.86  
Canada’s current arbitrariness/overbreadth/gross disproportionality 
principles are not worded in the same way as Lochner’s substantive due 
process principles. Canadian judges might bristle at any suggestion that 
they are engaging in “Lochnerizing”. Yet the resulting freedom of judges 
to overturn legislation based on a disagreement over the impugned law’s 
policy wisdom constitutes an overarching and resounding commonality. 
                                                                                                                       
83  BC Motor Vehicle Act Reference, supra, note 66, at para. 122. As a matter of full and fair 
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It is no small irony that when it was first faced with the choice of 
whether to allow for section 7 fundamental justice to engage a judicial 
review of the substantive content of an impugned law, or only the 
fairness of its procedures, the Supreme Court initially said, in the BC 
Motor Vehicle Reference case, that this was not something the Court 
needed to decide in that case.87 The irony arises from the fact that the 
Supreme Court has subsequently held that the BC Motor Vehicle 
Reference has decided that section 7’s principles of fundamental justice 
include both substantive and procedural principles.88  
Several critical cases in the history of section 7 could have been 
decided without section 7 at all. That would have avoided the problems I 
describe above. Three examples amply illustrate this: first, in the 
Charter’s earliest years, the BC Motor Vehicle Reference could have been 
readily considered under Charter section 12’s ban on cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment. In that case, the impugned law imposed a 
mandatory 7-day prison term for driving without a licence, regardless of 
the accused’s state of knowledge.89 A person could go to jail despite 
having bona fide and reasonably thought they had a valid licence. 
Second, in R. v. Heywood90 — the case that fully unleashed on Canada 
the section 7 overbreadth principle — the impugned restrictions on the 
offender’s liberty could also have instead been tested under Charter 
section 12’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Third, as is this 
article’s prime focus, Carter cried out for consideration under the section 15 
disability equality guarantee.  
Even if every point made so far in this article was assumed to be 
meritless, there is no sense in incorporating a backdoor equality 
requirement in Charter section 7, as the Supreme Court in effect did, in 
Carter. The Charter’s equality rights guarantee, if properly construed, 
has the potential to fully and effectively address equality claims. If the 
section 15 test were considered deficient, the proper solution would be to 
fix that test, rather than smuggling a second constitutional equality rights 
guarantee into section 7’s principles of fundamental justice. 
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Injecting a backdoor equality principle into the section 7 principles of 
fundamental justice makes no sense. It serves no constitutional purpose. 
It adds unnecessary complexity and potential confusion. Will the  
section 7 equality principle employ the same test as does section 15? If 
so, it adds nothing. If not, would it be broader or narrower than section 15? 
If narrower, it adds nothing. If broader, it adds confusion. Why not 
instead add to section 15 whatever new coverage it would have brought 
to section 7? Under a section 7 backdoor equality claim, should a court 
use all the section 15 equality analytical tools, no matter their foibles? 
If these should not be used when assessing a section 7 equality claim, 
because they are deficient, why should they remain in force under 
section 15? 
Can a party launch an equality claim under section 7 that does not 
involve any of the specific prohibited discrimination grounds listed in 
section 15 or on an analogous ground? If section 7’s equality principle 
allows for constitutional attacks on discrimination grounds other than  
the grounds enumerated in section 15 or those analogous to them, that 
throws section 7 into the morass of inviting open-ended equality claims 
that sadly flourished under section 15 in Canada’s lower courts during 
the 1980s. The Supreme Court wisely brought those to an end in its 
landmark Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia91 and R. v. 
Turpin92 decisions. For a detailed critique of the pre-Andrews section 15 
equality approach, see “Constitutional law - Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms - Section 15 - an Erroneous Approach to the Charter’s Equality 
Guarantee: R. v. Ertel”93 written by Schwartz and me. In both Andrews  
and Turpin, the Supreme Court cited this article with approval.94 To a 
great extent, the Supreme Court’s section 7 overbreadth approach 
replicates and revives problems that Schwartz and I raised over a quarter 
of a century ago in that article, there focusing on section 15 and not 
section 7. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: WITHER THE FUTURE? 
This article shows that there is a pressing need for several refinements 
to the Supreme Court’s approach to Charter sections 7 and 15.  
The Supreme Court’s section 7 fundamental justice overbreadth 
principle — if not the entire package of section 7 arbitrariness/ 
overbreadth/ gross disproportionality principles — needs a serious rethink. 
The best approach would be for the Court to go back to the section 7 
fundamental justice drawing board, and dispense with section 7 
arbitrariness/overbreadth/gross disproportionality review. The Supreme 
Court has commendably made significant changes to its approach to some 
other Charter provisions over time, based on its accumulated experience. 
This is best illustrated by its reboots of Charter section 24(2)’s Collins 
test,95 10 years later, in R. v. Stillman,96 and again over a decade after that, 
in R. v. Grant.97 
The Court should replace its open-ended and fatally flawed, 
arbitrariness/overbreadth/gross disproportionality principles with more 
refined, specific and targeted principles of fundamental justice. These 
should have objective and manageable standards. They should ensure that 
a law’s policy wisdom does not become the test of its constitutionality. 
They should be capable of producing reasonably predictable outcomes.  
When assessing the content of the principles of fundamental justice in 
a specific case, regard should be had to the severity of the denial of life, 
liberty or personal security. A more exacting fundamental justice test 
should apply where there is a substantial intrusion into life, liberty or 
personal security than where the intrusion is more remote, more unlikely 
or more trivial. This would better implement the commendable Supreme 
Court contextual approach to Charter rights. 
Wherever possible, the court should endeavour to first resolve a 
Charter claim by employing the Charter right that most specifically 
addresses the mischief that lies at the core of the claimant’s complaint.  
If it is a complaint that the law impedes a disability accommodation, then 
section 15 should be a court’s first stop. If other, more directly engaged 
Charter rights may not solve the case due to foibles with the existing case 
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law under those provisions, then that should signal to the Supreme Court 
that the pre-existing case law under those provisions also may call out  
for a reboot.  
A court should consider whether an impugned law violates more than 
one Charter right. It is arguably time to back away from the long-term 
practice in Canadian courts of going to section 1 right away, once it is 
clear that one Charter right is violated, and without first considering 
other Charter rights that may also be violated. A multiple rights violation 
can be relevant to the section 1 balancing, the design of remedies and any 
offer of judicial guidance to a legislature on principles to weigh when 
designing a replacement law or policy.  
The Supreme Court has made some great pronouncements about the 
Charter’s disability equality guarantee. Yet governments too readily 
disregard them. Consequently, the lives of Canadians with disabilities are 
full of accessibility barriers, many of which are a government 
responsibility. All violate the Charter and/or human rights statutes.  
People with disabilities have therefore resorted to pressing elected 
politicians to enact new laws to make the Charter and Human Rights Code 
protections become a reality in their lives. As a result, the Ontario 
Legislature passed the Ontarians with Disabilities Act in 2001,98 and the 
stronger Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act99 in 2005. The 
Manitoba Legislature passed The Accessibility for Manitobans Act100 in 
2013. The Nova Scotia Government is now designing a provincial 
disabilities Act.101 In the 2015 federal election, now Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau promised to enact a national disabilities Act.102  
In the 2007 Ontario provincial election, the three major party leaders 
promised that if elected, the Ontario Government would review all 
Ontario statutes and regulations for accessibility barriers.103 That of course, 
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is something the Charter’s disability equality guarantee necessitates.  
As of early 2016, the Ontario Government has only reviewed 51 of its 
750 statutes, and only proposed to amend a mere 11 of those laws it  
had reviewed.104 
The Supreme Court must speak louder and more clearly before 
legislatures will give the Charter’s disability equality guarantee the 
attention it deserves. The Carter case gave the Supreme Court an 
excellent opportunity to do just that. Next time, the Court should seize 
the moment. 
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